What began as a peaceful uprising against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad soon turned into a gruesome civil war, drawing in regional powers, leaving hundreds of thousands dead and pushing millions more to flee. Inspired by the Arab Spring uprisings in neighbouring countries, pro-democracy protests erupted in parts of Syria in early and soon spread across the country amid a brutal crackdown by Assad 's regime. The violence rapidly escalated and the country descended into a gruesome civil war involving the regular army and a host of rebel groups.
Western powers vowed to punish the Syrian regime should it make use of chemical weapons, but ultimately stepped back. Instead, Russia and Iran intervened decisively on Assad's side, turning the tide in his favour. An aspiring ophthalmologist who once shunned the limelight, Bashar was an unlikely candidate for Syrian strongman — until the deaths of his elder brother and his father propelled him to the top of the Assad dynasty.
This mindset and the intense predatory behavior of Rami Makhlouf and other peak cronies had a devastating effect on business actors who found themselves frozen out, forced to take Makhlouf on as a partner or to sell him their businesses. The businessmen on the receiving end of this sort of conduct were among those who supported the opposition. In addition, other business owners left the country as violence escalated, not for political reasons but to save their businesses.
On the other side, there were those who saw the conflict as an opportunity and moved to fill the gaps left by business owners who had fled or joined the opposition.
War is a hugely demanding economic enterprise, and meeting its needs created all kinds of possibilities for relative unknowns to make money and to become celebrity loyalists as a result.
What is also important, if much less visible, is the role of the conflict in creating a vast new cohort of wartime profiteers at the provincial and local levels, including through participation in criminal activities.
Anyone with the resources to fund a militia was able to become rich as a result and many local warlords did just that. Now, these wartime profiteers are looking to launder their illicit gains and buy themselves the trappings of legitimacy and respect that will solidify their positions — including through election to seats in parliament. Will the pre-war business establishment be able to restore its position?
I am doubtful. The changes we saw during the war are being consolidated and show every sign of becoming permanent. Russia seems to be capitalizing relatively well on its political and military influence. It appears to be much less the case for Iran. How do you explain that? Whether formally or informally, Iran and Russia seem to have established something of a division of labor in Syria, even as they compete to consolidate their influence through vastly different approaches.
At times, their ambitions bring them into conflict, and I would not be surprised to see tensions increase in the coming years. For now, however, they seem able to navigate the frictions in their relationship. For Russia, the key to stability in Syria is to strengthen state institutions, especially in the security sector, and restore the capacity of the state to govern.
Russia cares little about the quality of governance: it cares a lot about the quantity of governance. To Moscow, expanding and strengthening formal institutions is not only a way to consolidate its influence and expand its commercial ties in the country but also the best strategy for reducing the risk that it will find itself in a quagmire, forced to keep a dysfunctional regime on life-support as the country continues its downward spiral.
Iran, on the other hand, is working to expand and consolidate its influence through entirely different channels, by cultivating and strengthening its presence within non-state sectors, especially non-state armed groups but also among tribes and other local influentials.
It is working more quietly to establish a cultural and religious foothold, to build its own clientelist networks, to leverage its control of Hezbollah to assist in these efforts, and in general to put in place the foundations it sees as crucial for its long-term ambition to lock Syria into its strategic, economic, and cultural orbit as a critical member of the resistance front.
These different approaches have mitigated tensions between Russia and Iran to some extent. But where the two conflict — especially over issues relating to non-state armed groups — the potential for tensions to escalate is certainly present. Their differences on this have caused frictions in the relationship, but not an outright break. The Syrian economy in is in a particularly bad shape and regime allies seem helpless.
Do you think that these economic difficulties can impact the strategy of Moscow and Tehran? Thus far, Russia and Iran seem willing to bear the economic costs of their role as the leading patrons of the Assad regime. So, neither country seems to have reached the limits of its willingness to keep the regime afloat, albeit barely afloat. But he also understands why so many Syrians cling to these same institutions for stability and jobs in a region troubled by so many failed states.
Starr is a deft guide to Syria in the midst of revolution. For those less familiar, [his book] is essential reading to gather a deeper understanding of how Damascus ticks, and why it matters.
This account, therefore, has the texture and the drama of a genuine inside view. This depressing outlook is all too real, but Revolt in Syria is an important if uncomfortable reminder that there is still little movement towards any kind of solution.
Stephen Starr is a freelance Irish journalist who has been reporting from Damascus since He is also the founder and editor-in-chief of Near East Quarterly. Subscribers receive exclusive discounts and early access to new books from Hurst. In September , a US-led coalition launched air strikes inside Syria in an effort to "degrade and ultimately destroy" IS.
But the coalition has avoided attacks that might benefit Mr Assad's forces. Russia began an air campaign targeting "terrorists" in Syria a year later, but opposition activists say its strikes have mostly killed Western-backed rebels and civilians. In the political arena, opposition groups are also deeply divided, with rival alliances battling for supremacy.
However, the exile group has little influence on the ground in Syria and its primacy is rejected by many opponents of Mr Assad. With neither side able to inflict a decisive defeat on the other, the international community long ago concluded that only a political solution could end the conflict in Syria.
The UN Security Council has called for the implementation of the Geneva Communique , which envisages a transitional governing body with full executive powers "formed on the basis of mutual consent".
Talks in early , known as Geneva II, broke down after only two rounds, with then-UN special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi blaming the Syrian government's refusal to discuss opposition demands.
Mr Brahimi's successor, Staffan de Mistura, focused on establishing a series of local ceasefires. His plan for a "freeze zone" in Aleppo was rejected, but a three-year siege of the Homs suburb of al-Wair was successfully brought to an end in December At the same time, the conflict with IS lent fresh impetus to the search for a political solution in Syria.
The US and Russia led efforts to get representatives of the government and the opposition to attend "proximity talks" in Geneva in January to discuss a Security Council-endorsed road map for peace, including a ceasefire and a transitional period ending with elections. What began as another Arab Spring uprising against an autocratic ruler has mushroomed into a brutal proxy war that has drawn in regional and world powers. Iran and Russia have propped up the Alawite-led government of President Assad and gradually increased their support.
Tehran is believed to be spending billions of dollars a year to bolster Mr Assad, providing military advisers and subsidised weapons, as well as lines of credit and oil transfers. Russia has meanwhile launched an air campaign against Mr Assad's opponents. The Syrian government has also enjoyed the support of Lebanon's Shia Islamist Hezbollah movement, whose fighters have provided important battlefield support since Until late , rebel appeals for anti-aircraft weapons to stop devastating government air strikes were rejected by the US and its allies, amid concern that they might end up in the hands of jihadist militants.
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